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Abstract  
This paper is concerned with evaporation of moderately volatile liquids, 
gasoline in particular, due to spray generation, liquid fragmentation and 
fountain effects following accidental puncture of a pressurized pipeline.  
Hazard analysis predicts that extensive evaporation will take place.  The paper 
examines a typical fuel depot receiving gasoline from a ship at a nearby port 
via an above-ground pipeline.  For comparative purposes, two types of 
accidental release during import are considered: 1) The receiving tank 
overflows in a worst-case Buncefield-type event (baseline).  2) The import 
pipeline is punctured and a jet of liquid discharges upwards.   
The paper examines pipeline import of three substances, hexane, octane and 
winter gasoline.  Hazard analysis using the PHAST software suite indicates 
that the amount of fuel evaporated from the pipeline puncture scenarios greatly 
exceeds the amount evaporated in a tank overfill event for all three substances, 
gasoline in particular.  Proper modelling of evaporation of wide-range multi-
component mixtures such as gasoline is challenging however.  PHAST's 
simplified thermodynamic modelling of properties of mixtures may be a source 
of error.  A PHAST-based stand-alone spray evaporation model with advanced 
thermodynamic capability is developed.  Results indicate that PHAST does 
indeed overestimate evaporation of mixtures.  Still, model output shows that 
evaporation following pipeline puncture may exceed the evaporation from a 
Buncefield-type tank overfill event by a factor of two or more.  This finding is 
significant as evaporation from pipeline puncture scenarios appear largely 
overlooked in hazard analysis.  The finding may lead to a fundamental re-
appraisal of the hazard potential of fuel depots and pipelines. 
- 251 words 
Keywords: Major accident hazard; Onshore pipelines; Spray release, 
Consequence models, Fuel depot, Worst design event 
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1 Introduction 
Before 2005, the storage of gasoline in large aboveground tanks was thought to 
present rather limited risks to neighbours.  The worst design event associated 
with a tank farm was believed to be a large pool fire following tank failure.  
Predicted hazard distances rarely exceeded 200 m [1], [2].   
In 2005, an incident at the UK Buncefield fuel depot fundamentally changed 
the perceived hazard potential of gasoline fuel depots – the worst event became 
a vapour cloud explosion.  The sequence of events at Buncefield can be 
summarized as follows: During a fuel import, a gasoline tank overfilled.  Large 
amounts of gasoline flowed from breather openings in the tank roof and fell 
(cascaded) into the bund area.  The volatile components in the gasoline 
vaporized rapidly and mixed with air to form a flammable mixture that 
subsequently exploded with devastating force.   
The Buncefield explosion took place early Sunday morning, the area was quiet 
and there were no fatalities.  While nobody was killed, the potential for a mass-
casualty event is obvious.  Property damage was extensive.  The fuel depot was 
close to some 630 businesses employing about 16,500 people.  The premises of 
20 businesses employing 500 people were destroyed and the premises of 60 
businesses employing 3,500 people were severely damaged [3].  Buildings as 
far as 8 kilometres from the depot, suffered lesser damage, such as broken 
windows, and damaged walls and ceilings.  Costs were estimated at about £1 
billion [2]. 
The Buncefield incident had major implications for hazard analysis of fuel 
depots.  The new insights can be summarized as: 1) An unforeseen release 
mechanism (overflow and cascading), leading to extensive evaporation of the 
lighter components of gasoline; and 2) An unforeseen explosion mechanism, 
producing destructive blast pressures even though the area around the depot 
was considered rather open and uncongested.  The Buncefield incident led to a 
worldwide re-appreciation of the major hazard potential of fuel depots.  The 
concern now became a Buncefield-type tank overfill event, late ignition and a 
so-called Open Flammable Cloud Explosion (OFCE) [2], [4]–[6]. 
This paper draws attention to another release mechanism capable of producing 
a large vapour cloud, which to the best of our knowledge has received little 
attention in the literature: Puncture of an import pipeline results in a jet spray of 
liquid gasoline that discharges upwards and forms a fountain with many 
droplets, which leads to extensive evaporation of the lighter components of 
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gasoline.  We present evidence to suggest that this spray scenario may 
evaporate more fuel than a Buncefield-type overfill event.  Hence, it may 
constitute a worst-case scenario in fuel depot hazard analysis that is currently 
overlooked.   
We are of the opinion that the pipeline puncture scenario is particularly relevant 
for hazard analysis of fuel depots at marine terminals.  Import or export 
pipelines are often located above ground and may be vulnerable to external 
impact, e.g.  dropped objects, or for pipe bridges above road crossings, collision 
impact by heavy vehicle.   
A gasoline pipeline risk analysis approach published in 1999 [7] considered a 
pipeline leak or rupture forming a pool of gasoline from which evaporation and 
ignition resulted in a flash fire which burned back to produce a pool fire.  The 
study assumed that soil permeability determined the size of the unignited pool 
and hence the rate of evaporation feeding a vapour cloud.  Gasoline was 
assumed to be absorbed into the ground after which it presented no safety risk.  
Estimated pools were rather small, for a rupture with a release rate of 205 kg/s 
and delayed ignition, the maximum pool diameter was 100 m.  Evaporation 
from spray and fountain effects were not considered.   
Another pipeline risk analysis approach also published in 1999 [8] considered 
the length of throw of a jet of gasoline, which could douse occupied buildings 
and later engulf them in flames.  Spray formation was briefly mentioned but 
evaporation was not addressed.  A risk analysis of a Polish gasoline cross 
country pipeline published in 2006 [9] did not consider spray evaporation 
either. 
More recent oil and gas pipeline risk studies in 2015 and 2016 [10], [11] do not 
address spray evaporation of liquids with volatile components.  A 2017 study 
on pipeline accidents and land-use planning [12] does not appear to rule out an 
explosion following the accidental release of "volatile liquid materials" but the 
discussion lacks precision, as the study is based on analysis of historical data 
and struggles with incomplete information and other limitations of (often 
discontinued) accident databases.  The work of [13] presents an exception to 
this general picture, as they briefly attempt to extend their models of tank 
overfill events to cover spray releases also.   
In conclusion, rapid evaporation of large quantities of flammable vapours from 
puncture of a gasoline pipeline due to spray and fountain effects is a scenario 
currently given little or no consideration in pipeline risk analysis studies.   
The main thrust of this work relates to hazard analysis of evaporation from a 
spray release of gasoline.  We examine the generation of vapour following a 
puncture of a pressurized gasoline import pipeline to a fuel depot.  For 
perspective, we compare the results with the amount evaporated in case the 
same import pipeline would result in a Buncefield-type overfill scenario.  The 
purpose is to examine the relevance of the spray release scenario as major 
hazard scenario and potential worst design event to be considered in hazard 
analysis of fuel depots.  To our knowledge, no previous work has addressed this 
topic. 
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A representation of the composition of gasoline is required before modelling 
and process hazard analysis can take place.  This is no trivial task as gasoline is 
a complex mixture of hundreds of hydrocarbons with very different boiling 
points.  Earlier experimental and simulation work , see e.g.  the comprehensive 
research program on vapour cloud formation reported in [14], used hexane to 
represent gasoline in order to simplify analysis, or at best used a four-
component mixture of butane, pentane, hexane and decane.  A second thrust of 
this paper is to define a generic wide-range multi-component hydrocarbon 
composition with properties similar to a typical winter gasoline for use in 
consequence modelling.  To our knowledge, this contribution is also novel.   
There are a variety of consequence modelling software suites available [15].  
This work uses the commercially available software suite for process hazard 
analysis PHAST developed by DNV GL.  PHAST is referred to in international 
peer-reviewed journals, in model benchmark analysis [16], in post-accident 
comparative analysis [17] and in consequence model validation studies [18], 
[19].  Specifically, we point to articles on validation of PHAST's models for 
spray releases [20], [21]. 
We have certain a priori reservations regarding the ability of well-established 
hazard analysis software suites to handle wide-range multi-component mixtures 
such as gasoline.  The approach taken in PHAST to thermodynamic modelling 
of mixture properties is simplified, essentially a mixture is represented by a 
"pseudo-pure component".  A third thrust of this work is therefore to construct 
a stand-alone spray evaporation model faithful to the one implemented in 
PHAST and then enhance this model with advanced thermodynamic modelling 
capability.  The purpose is to examine the effect of improved thermodynamic 
modelling of mixtures on the estimated amount of evaporation for spray 
releases.  There are numerous theoretical and practical challenges associated 
with extracting a single stand-alone model from a suite of integrated models.  
Juxtaposition of the results from PHAST and the PHAST-based Stand-Alone 
Model (SAM) will provide a crude but nonetheless essential indication of the 
magnitude of any errors potentially caused by simplified thermodynamic 
modelling.  To our knowledge, no previous study has attempted advanced 
thermodynamic modelling of spray evaporation of wide-range multi-component 
mixtures for accidental loss of containment events. 
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2 Material and methods 
2.1 Overview 
The research methodology is summarized in Figure 1.  Accordingly, the work 
reported here comprises the following steps: 
1 Definition of release scenarios, input parameters and substance property 
models 
1.1 Description of a generic fuel depot configuration and a typical 
gasoline import situation  
1.2 Specification of two types loss of containment (LOC) events during 
the gasoline import: 1) a Buncefield-type tank overfill scenario 
(baseline), and 2) puncture of the pressurized import pipeline  
1.3 Definition of a generic multi-component hydrocarbon composition to 
represent a typical winter gasoline 
2 Estimation of evaporation from a Buncefield-type over-fill scenario based 
on large-scale experimental work reported by HSE/HSL and FABIG  
3 Estimation of evaporation from pipeline puncture scenarios, using: 
3.1 The PHAST software suite's (ver.  8.0) recommended settings, i.e.  the 
default release rate and spray evaporation models and the available 
thermodynamic package for multi-component mixtures  
3.2 A stand-alone PHAST-like spray evaporation model faithful to the 
one in PHAST but enhanced with advanced thermodynamic modelling 
of multi-component mixtures, implemented in MATLAB software.   
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Case: Generic gasoline import from ship to fuel depot via above-ground pipeline, 
define configuration, input parameters and a multi-component mixture 
to represent a typical winter gasoline (henceforth winter gasoline 2)
Buncefield-type 
worst-case tank overfill scenario 
(baseline)
Pipeline puncture and 
major spray release scenario
(alternative)
FABIG correlations 
based on large-scale 
experimental work by 
UK HSE/HSL
Recommended PHAST 
model with available 
thermodynamics 
for mixtures 
PHAST-like Stand-Alone 
Model (SAM) with 
advanced thermo-
dynamics for mixtures 
(in MATLAB)
Commercial hexane
Winter gasoline 1 
n-hexane 
n-octane
Winter gasoline 2
 n-hexane
n-octane
Winter gasoline 2 
Estimate amount of fuel 
evaporated due to 
cascade and splash 
effects
(hexane, gasoline 1)
Estimate amount of fuel 
evaporated due to 
spray and fountain 
effects
(hexane, gasoline 2)
Estimate amount of fuel 
evaporated due to 
spray and fountain 
effects
(gasoline 2)
Comparative analysis and discussion: During gasoline import, may a pipeline puncture event 
evaporate more fuel than a Buncefield-type overfil l event 
model
tuning
Step 1
Step 2 Step 3
LOC
scenario
Model
Substances
Objective
Purpose
 
Figure 1.   Methodology and purpose of this study 
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2.2 Step 1: Definition of model scenarios and input 
parameters 
2.2.1 Configuration of generic fuel depot and a typical gasoline 
import situation 
Fuel depots typically receive gasoline from a marine tanker at a nearby port or 
from a distant tank farm via a cross-country pipeline.  This study considers 
imports of gasoline from tankers at ports only.  Typically, import pipelines at 
ports are a few kilometres long and pressures are in the 10-15 barg range, 
whereas the length of cross-country pipelines are measured in hundreds of 
kilometres and pressures often exceed 100 barg.  Hence, if spray effects are 
relevant for pipelines at port terminals, they are even more so for cross-country 
pipelines with much higher internal pressures.   
We have assumed a typical import rate of 1,000 m³/h.  For perspective, the 
import rate (via cross-country pipeline) to the overflowing tank at Buncefield 
was 550 m³/h, increasing to 890 m³/h [1]. 
A fuel terminal informed, that certain refineries ship warm gasoline, which 
even after a 2-3 day Atlantic Sea voyage during wintertime can be warm upon 
arrival.  We have assumed a liquid temperature of 20 °C for winter gasoline.  
For details, refer to Table 1, section A. 
2.2.2 Specification of tank overfill and pipeline puncture 
scenarios 
The Buncefield-type tank overfill scenario is assumed to result from a failure of 
the receiving tank's level indication and overfill protection systems.  The entire 
import flow rate runs from openings in the tank roof and forms a free cascade 
that is projected away from the tank wall.  The cascade and splashing at the 
base lead to extensive evaporation of the lighter components of gasoline.  For 
details, refer to Table 1, section B. 
The pipeline puncture scenario is assumed to result from some external impact, 
e.g.  truck driver forgets to lower the crane arm and collides with a pipe bridge 
(road overpass) about 100 m from the ship.  A jet of liquid discharges upwards 
through an orifice, forming a fountain with many droplets, which leads to 
extensive evaporation of the lighter components of gasoline.  Four hole sizes 
are considered for which the combination of hole size and pipeline back-
pressure (orifice pressure) allows the release of 95%, 75%, 50% and 25% of the 
nominal import flow rate.  Two pipeline lengths are considered.  Their different 
friction loss profiles result in different orifice pressures at the puncture location.  
For details, refer to Table 1, section C. 
Liquid not evaporated while airborne will rain-out on the ground and form a 
pool from which further evaporation will take place.  The rate of evaporation is 
a function of the pool area, which is unknown.  To simplify analysis, pool 
evaporation is ignored.  Effects of wind on evaporation while droplets are 
airborne are also ignored, only calm conditions are considered. 
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2.3 Step 2: Estimation of evaporation from Buncefield-
type tank overfill scenario 
Our modelling of the amount evaporated in a Buncefield-type overfill event is 
based on the results of large-scale experimental work carried out by the UK 
HSE/HSL [14], in particular the empirical correlations reported by the Fire and 
Blast Information Group (FABIG) Technical Note 12 [13], [22].  The FABIG 
source provides empirical correlations for hexane and winter grade gasoline. 
An examination of the background study [14] reveals that the correlation for 
hexane is based on experiments with commercial hexane, i.e. a mixture of 
several hexane isomers.  The correlation for winter grade gasoline appears to be 
based on experiments with a mixture of n-butane, n-pentane, n-hexane and n-
decane.  We consider the results from this ambitious research program to 
provide the best guidance currently available for estimation of worst-case 
evaporation resulting from a tank overfill event. 
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Table 1. Definition of loss-of-containment (LOC) scenarios  
A) Import pipeline and fuel transfer 
Nominal import flow rate 1,000 m³ / h 
Pipeline lengths considered 1,000 m and 2,000 m 
Pressure source Pump at marine tanker 
Temperature of imported liquid 20 °C 
Pipeline internal diameter 250 mm 
Armatures in pipeline 50 bends, 8 valves  
 
 
B) Tank overflow scenarios 
Liquids considered Commercial hexane a, winter grade gasoline a,b 
Flow rate of overtopping liquid 1,000 m³ / h 
Temperature of liquid 20 °C 
Tank diameter 29  m 
Tank height 20 m 
Ambient conditions Calm wind, 10 °C 
Evaporation from rainout fraction Ignored 
a The compositions used in large-scale experimental work [14]  
b Referred to as gasoline 1 
 
C) Pipeline puncture scenarios 
Liquids considered n-hexane, n-octane, winter gasoline a 
Release rate (expressed as fraction of 
nominal import flow rate) 
25%, 50%, 75% and 95% 
Pipeline length 1,000 m and 2,000 m 
Angle of jet from horizontal 45° and 80° 
Temperature of liquid 20 °C 
Ambient conditions Calm wind, 10 °C 
Evaporation from rainout fraction Ignored 
a Wide-range multi-component mixture with properties similar to a typical winter 
gasoline.  This composition is referred to as gasoline 2. 
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2.4 Estimation of evaporation from of pipeline 
puncture scenarios 
2.4.1 Spray evaporation using PHAST 
PHAST modelling of evaporation from a pipeline puncture and spray release is 
described in the PHAST technical documentation [23]. 
It comprises three steps: 
1 A discharge model based on Bernoulli’s equation for incompressible 
fluids. 
2 A droplet formation model based on an aerodynamic break-up mechanism.  
The Sauter mean droplet diameter is calculated based on the work of [24] 
3 An aerosol jet dispersion and evaporation model-based on the work of 
[25]. 
The core of the droplet evaporation model is the solution of differential 
equations describing droplet mass and temperature change due to droplet 
evaporation.  Evaporation terminates when the droplet trajectory intercepts with 
ground level, known as droplet rainout.  For spray releases of mixtures such as 
gasoline, PHAST represents the mixture with a pseudo-pure component  The 
PHAST thermodynamic property model for the mixture is based on the AIChE 
DIPPR database for which details are available in [26]. 
2.4.2 Spray evaporation using PHAST-based stand-alone model 
A Stand-Alone Model (SAM) for spray release evaporation from pipeline 
puncture has been implemented in MATLAB, a computing environment 
provided by MathWorks [27].  The SAM shares the same theoretical 
foundation and takes the same approach as PHAST.  SAM output is tuned to 
PHAST output for selected scenarios with pure substances.  The aim has been 
to provide an as faithful representation of the PHAST model as possible, within 
the time and budget constraints of this project, which gives similar results when 
applied to spray releases of pure substances.   
The SAM is then enhanced with advanced thermodynamic modelling capability 
for mixtures, a capability PHAST has not.  The advanced thermodynamic 
modelling of mixture compositions is based on the GERG-2008 multi-
parameter wide-range Equation of State (EoS) for natural gases and mixtures 
[28].  GERG-2008 widely known to be one of the most accurate and reliable 
property models for fuel mixtures.  It has been used to calculate mixture 
properties for various technical applications.  In particular, it is used to model 
liquid hydrocarbon mixtures in industrial chemical processes and 
thermodynamic cycles.  GERG-2008 is based on an explicit formulation of the 
Helmholtz free energy as function of density, temperature and composition.  It 
allows calculating real mixture properties such as liquid phase and vapour 
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phase pressures, densities, enthalpies, entropies as well as heat capacities.  For 
details, refer to Appendix A. 
A major challenge for the PHAST-based Stand-Alone Model arises because 
some of PHAST's computations of energy balance, mechanical turbulent 
mixing with ambient air and droplet trajectory take place in the Unified 
Dispersion Model (UDM) module [21], [29] of the PHAST software suite, not 
in the spray module.  A stand-alone model of the UDM module is beyond the 
scope of the present work however.   
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3 Generic multi-component hydrocarbon 
composition similar to a typical winter 
gasoline 
Commercial gasoline is a mixture of a large number of hydrocarbons with 
different boiling points.  The exact composition of gasoline is unknown and 
varies according to the crude oils from which it is produced, the type of 
processing units present at the refinery, how those units are operated and which 
hydrocarbon streams (blendstocks) the refinery opts to use when blending the 
final product. 
In Europe, gasolines must meet the requirements set forth in EN 228 [30].  
Important specifications relate to volatility and Research Octane Number 
(RON).  The fuel volatility requirement, measured as Reid Vapour Pressure 
(RVP) at 37.8 °C (100 °F), reflects a compromise; on the ability to start a cold 
engine while at the same time avoid excessive evaporative losses of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs), which are unwanted air pollutants.  The fuel 
volatility specification varies according to geographical area and season, with 
higher volatility during winter.  In Denmark, the maximum RVP is 70 kPa 
summer and 95 kPa winter.  Refiners typically adjust the vapour pressure by 
adding butane (C4) to the gasoline blend.  Because the price of butane is lower 
than that of gasoline, refiners have an economic incentive in meeting the 
maximum permitted RVP.   
At the refinery, the heavy virgin naphtha (HVN) fraction (mainly C7-C9) from 
crude oil distillation is processed in a reformer unit, which converts cyclic 
alkanes (naphtenes) and other hydrocarbons to unsaturated and ring-shaped 
aromatic compounds (e.g. benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene, xylenes), which 
have much higher octane numbers.  Refiners avoid feeding C6 to the reformer 
unit, in particular cyclohexane, as this would be converted to benzene, for 
which EN 228 sets a maximum content of one percent volume fraction due to 
its adverse health effects.  The stream leaving the reformer unit is known as 
reformate.  Refiners typically adjust the octane number of the gasoline blend by 
adding reformate.   
The light virgin naphtha (LVN) fraction (mainly C5-C6) has a high content of 
straight chain alkanes with low octane numbers.  Some refineries have an 
isomerization unit, which convert them into branched isomers, which have 
higher octane numbers.  The stream leaving the isomerization units is known as 
isomerate.  Refiners can use the rather volatile isomerate as a base blendstock 
in gasoline blending.   
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The description above is highly simplified.  There are many other options, and 
the economic performance of the refinery depends much on its ability to 
optimize gasoline blending operations.   
Because winter gasolines contain more volatiles, we select a typical Danish 95 
octane winter gasoline composition for our study.  We have communicated 
(personal communication) with a refinery on gasoline blending operations and 
the blendstocks used, and with a large laboratory which undertakes certification 
work that commercial gasolines meet specifications.  The refinery and the 
laboratory have kindly supplied relevant information for our gasoline 
composition work, but both wish not to be named.   
The refinery informs that the typical main blendstocks for gasoline formulation 
are isomerate, reformate and butane.  Refer to Table 3 for stream properties.  
Isomerate is rather volatile with 85 %-vol evaporated at 70 °C, while only 4%-
vol of the reformate has evaporated at this temperature.  The laboratory 
provided analysis results of two typical 95 RON winter gasoline formulations, 
here shown as Blend1 and Blend2 in Table 3.  Blend1 contains much isomerate.  
Blend2 has less isomerate and some low-RON straight chain LVN paraffins, 
which the refinery likely had in surplus.  Hence, Blend2 has a higher content of 
reformate to meet the RON specification, and a higher butane content to meet 
the upper RVP limit.  The two blends are typical and both meet the 95 RON 
winter gasoline specification but because of different formulations, their C4-
C11 distributions differ.  The two blends illustrate the inherent compositional 
variability of "commercial gasoline" and the practical challenges associated 
with defining a model composition based on pure substances. 
The isomerate is too volatile for the RON to be determined experimentally.  
Instead, the RON is computed based on gas chromatograph analysis which 
provides detailed information on the composition.  Based on this information 
and an additional iso-pentane blendstock, we define a wide-range multi-
component mixture to represent a generic European winter gasoline, named 
Gen13 in Table 2. 
The initial Buncefield report [1] grouped butanes, pentanes and hexanes as the 
'lighter components' in gasoline.  Our a-priori expectation is therefore that the 
most relevant compounds to consider for spray and fountain evaporation are in 
the C4-C6 range.  While there is little doubt that the highly volatile C4 fraction 
will evaporate with ease, good modelling of evaporation of the moderately 
volatile C5 and C6 fractions appears essential.  The isomers of these fractions 
have a wide range of boiling points, e.g.  28-49 °C for C5 alkanes and 50-81 °C 
for C6 alkanes.  An accurate representation of these compounds, in particular 
the most volatile alkane isomers, may therefore be important.  The Gen13 
model composition attempts to do this.  The composition is modelled on 
Blend1, which had the highest content of C4-C6 volatiles.  Due to 
unavailability of thermodynamic interaction parameters in the NIST REFPROP 
database [31] for several isomers, this study uses a simplified composition, 
Sim10, to represent 95 RON winter gasoline, henceforth referred to as gasoline 
2. 
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Table 2.   Two example compositions to represent a generic European RON95 
winter gasoline.  This paper uses the simplified 10-component mixture 
(Sim10), also referred to as gasoline 2 
Component 
 
CAS 
 
BP 
°C 
Gen13 
%-vol 
Sim10 
%-vol 
Iso-Butane 75-28-5 -12 3.58 3.58 
n-Butane 106-97-8 -1 6.58 6.58 
iso-Pentane 78-78-4 28 17.88 17.88 
Cyclopentane 287-92-3 49 - 9.44 
2.2-Dimetylbutane 75-83-2 50 4.23 - 
2-Methylpentane 107-83-5 60 10.42 - 
n-Hexane 110-54-3 69 - 8.94 
Methylcyclopentane 96-37-7 72 3.73 - 
CycloHexane 110-82-7 81 5.82 5.82 
2-Methylhexane 591-76-4 92 3.26 - 
n-Heptane 142-82-5 98 - 3.26 
Toluene 108-88-3 111 18.41 25.00 
n-Octane 111-65-9 126 3.45 10.00 
m-Xylene 108-38-3 139 15.06 - 
n-Nonane 111-84-2 151 5.44 9.49 
Decane 124-18-5 174 2.12 - 
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Table 3.   Characteristic properties of typical gasoline blendstocks and two 
typical commercial 95 RON winter gasoline blends.  For comparison, 
the properties of two suggested generic compositions are also shown.   
 Typical blendstock  
Commercial 95 RON 
raw a winter gasoline 
Multi-component 
model mixtures 
Isomerate Reformate Butane Blend 1 Blend 2 Gen13 Simple10 
Density at 15 °C kg/m3 677 810 577 738 745 
Evaporated at 70 °C %-vol 84.6 3.6 35-37 35-37 
Evaporated at 100 °C %-vol 97.3 13.6 58-59 58-59 
Final Boiling Point °C 192 188-190 188-190 
Reid Vapour Pressure kPa 73.5 29.4 315.0 85-88 a 85-88 a 91.4 90.2 
Research Octane Number 88.3 98.8 95.4 93.7 a 93.7 a 
Mole weight g/mol 58.0 92.9 93.4 87.5 84.9 
Paraffins %-vol 74.2 31.2 100.0 54.7 52.1 
Aromatics %-vol 0.0 67.2 36.0 41.2 
Naphtenes %-vol 26.5 0.9 9.0 6.0 
Benzene %-vol 1.5 0.9 1.1 a 
Total C3 %-vol 1.8 
Total C4 %-vol 0.5 4.2 97.4 8.1 11.9 10.2 10.2 
Total C5 %-vol 33.8 0.7 19.5 16.3 18.6 27.3 
Total C6 %-vol 60.4 0.1 23.0 15.9 23.2 14.8 
Total C7 %-vol 3.9 21.5 25.8 21.9 28.3 
Total C8 %-vol 1.5 15.9 17.7 18.7 10.0 
Total C9 %-vol 9.0 9.3 5.3 9.5 
Total C10 %-vol 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Total C11+ %-vol 0.4 0.5 
a  Raw gasoline refers to qualities handled at depots.  Ethanol (5 %-vol) is added later in 
the distribution chain, raising the octane number to 95 RON and the RVP to just below 95 
kPa at the pump.   
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4 Results 
FABIG estimation of evaporation for a Buncefield-type tank overfill scenario is 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Vapour generation in case of Buncefield-type tank overfill event 
(baseline), import rate 1,000 m³/h  
Model substance  
 
Import rate 
[kg/s] 
Evaporation 
rate a [kg/s] 
Fraction of import 
rate evaporated [-] 
Hexane b 182 35.8 0.197 
Winter grade gasoline c 206 40.7 0,198 
Heavy reformate d 225 9.53 0.042 
a Estimates based on experimental and theoretical work [14] and correlations [13] 
b Based on experimental work with commercial hexane (mixture of hexane isomers). 
c Also referred to in this article as "gasoline 1".  Correlation is likely based on 
experimental work with model mixture of butane, pentane, hexane and decane. 
d Example of low-volatility substance, correlation is available but experimental basis and 
composition are unclear. 
The results of the PHAST modelling of pipeline puncture scenarios are shown 
in Table 5.  Beside the evaporation rate and the fraction evaporated, also the 
orifice diameter, the release rate, the estimated back-pressure in the pipeline 
required to attain the scenario release rate, and the initial droplet diameter are 
tabulated.  Unsurprisingly, a reduction in the orifice diameter gives a smaller 
release rate and a higher orifice back-pressure, which in turn gives a more 
efficient droplet atomization (smaller droplet diameter) and a more pronounced 
droplet evaporation.  It is noteworthy that for relatively modest orifice back-
pressures, say larger than 4 barg, the model predicts almost complete 
evaporation of spray releases of moderately volatile liquids such as hexane and 
winter gasoline.   
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 Angle to horizontal 45° Angle to horizontal 80° 
Substance 
 
Pipeline 
length  
 
[m] 
Leak 
(fraction of 
import rate) 
[%] 
Orifice 
diameter  
 
[mm] 
Orifice-
area  
 
[%] 
Orifice-
pressure  
 
[barg] 
Release 
rate  
 
[kg/s] 
Initial 
droplet 
diameter  
[µm] 
Evaporation 
rate  
 
[kg/s] 
Fraction of 
release rate 
evaporated  
[-] 
Fraction of 
import rate 
evaporated  
[-] 
Evaporation 
rate  
 
[kg/s] 
Fraction of 
release rate 
evaporated  
[-] 
Fraction of 
import rate 
evaporated  
[-] 
n-hexane 1,000 95% 169 46% 1.19 179 461 36.5 0.20 0.19 44.5 0,25 0,24 
n-hexane 1,000 75% 137 30% 1.70 140 323 45.1 0.32 0.24 58.0 0,41 0,31 
n-hexane 1,000 50% 95 14% 3.31 94 166 68.2 0.72 0.36 89.0 0,95 0,47 
n-hexane 1,000 25% 58 5% 5.98 47 92 46.9 1.00 0.25 46.9 1,00 0,25 
n-hexane 2,000 95% 168 45% 1.20 177 457 36.5 0.21 0.19 44.0 0,25 0,23 
n-hexane 2,000 75% 130 27% 2.12 141 259 57.7 0.41 0.31 75.9 0,54 0,40 
n-hexane 2,000 50% 86 12% 4.99 95 110 94.2 1.00 0.50 94.6 1,00 0,50 
n-hexane 2,000 25% 51 4% 9.77 47 56 46.8 1.00 0.25 46.8 1,00 0,25 
n-octane 1,000 95% 169 46% 1.27 194 516 8.5 0.04 0.04 10.5 0,05 0,05 
n-octane 1,000 75% 137 30% 1.81 152 362 11.1 0.07 0.05 14.6 0,10 0,07 
n-octane 1,000 50% 95 14% 3.52 102 186 17.9 0.18 0.09 25.9 0,25 0,13 
n-octane 1,000 25% 58 5% 6.37 51 103 20.2 0.40 0.10 30.7 0,60 0,15 
n-octane 2,000 95% 168 45% 1.28 193 512 8.5 0.04 0.04 10.5 0,05 0,05 
n-octane 2,000 75% 130 27% 2.26 153 290 14.4 0.09 0.07 19.4 0,13 0,10 
n-octane 2,000 50% 86 12% 5.31 103 124 27.4 0.27 0.13 41.2 0,40 0,20 
n-octane 2,000 25% 51 4% 10.40 51 63 31.2 0.61 0.15 47.5 0,93 0,23 
Gasoline 2 1,000 95% 169 46% 1.30 194 535 64.5 0.33 0.32 75.2 0,39 0,37 
Gasoline 2 1,000 75% 137 30% 1.86 153 374 75.2 0.49 0.37 92.1 0,60 0,45 
Gasoline 2 1,000 50% 95 14% 3.61 102 193 97.3 0.95 0.48 102.2 1,00 0,50 
Gasoline 2 1,000 25% 58 5% 6.53 51 107 51.0 1.00 0.25 51.0 1,00 0,25 
Gasoline 2 2,000 95% 168 45% 1.32 193 527 65.2 0.34 0.32 76.1 0,39 0,37 
Gasoline 2 2,000 75% 130 27% 2.32 153 300 92.8 0.60 0.45 115.2 0,75 0,56 
Gasoline 2 2,000 50% 86 12% 5.45 103 128 102.9 1.00 0.50 102.9 1,00 0,50 
Gasoline 2 2,000 25% 51 4% 10.67 51 65 51.03 1.00 0.25 51.03 1,00 0,25 
Table 5.   Vapour generation for pipeline puncture scenarios, estimated using PHAST.  Release rate is the total liquid release rate before evaporation. 
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Juxtaposition of the fraction evaporated from Buncefield-type tank overfill 
events (Table 4) and pipeline puncture events (Table 5) are shown in Figure 2.  
For moderately volatile liquids such as hexane and winter gasoline, the worst-
case pipeline puncture event appears to be a combination of hole size and 
pipeline back-pressure that leads to the release about 50 percent of the import 
rate.  The amount of fuel vaporized then exceeds that of a worst-case tank 
overfill event by a factor two or more.  Although smaller hole sizes lead to 
higher orifice back-pressures and more efficient spray evaporation, the release 
rate also lowers, leading to an overall decrease in the amount of fuel 
evaporated.   
Table 6 presents the results of using PHAST and the more advanced property 
model in the PHAST-based Stand-Alone Model (SAM).  Figure 3 presents 
results for winter grade gasoline evaporation (the two spray angle cases 
averaged).  SAM predicts less evaporation than PHAST but still significantly 
more than the baseline tank overfill scenario. 
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A) 
 
Evaporation of moderately volatile liquid.  PHAST estimation uses n-
hexane, FABIG estimation uses correlation for commercial hexane 
B) 
 
Evaporation of low-volatility liquid.  PHAST estimation uses n-octane, 
FABIG estimation uses correlation for heavy reformate 
C) 
 
Evaporation of 95 RON winter gasoline.  PHAST estimation uses Sim10 
(gasoline 2) composition, FABIG estimation uses correlation for gasoline 1. 
Figure 2.   Evaporation following pipeline puncture event due to spray effects 
estimated using PHAST (vertical bars) compared with evaporation for 
Buncefield-type tank overfill event estimated using FABIG correlations 
(horizontal line).  Evaporation is expressed as fraction of import rate. 
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Table 6.   Effects of choice of model for computing thermodynamic properties of mixtures on evaporation.  Comparison of the simple model in PHAST and 
the advanced PHAST-based Stand-Alone Model (SAM) 
 
  
  
Angle to horizontal 45° Angle to horizontal 80° 
Substance Pipeline 
length  
[m] 
Leak 
(% 
import 
rate) 
Release rate [kg/s] 
Initial droplet diameter 
[µm] 
Evaporation rate [kg/s] 
Fraction of import rate 
evaporated [-] 
Evaporation rate [kg/s] 
Fraction of import rate 
evaporated [-] 
 PHAST SAM PHAST SAM PHAST SAM PHAST SAM PHAST SAM PHAST SAM 
n-hexane 1,000 95% 179 178 461 485 36,5 36,8 0,19 0,20 44,5 45,9 0,24 0,25 
n-hexane 1,000 75% 140 139 323 345 45,1 45,2 0,24 0,24 58,0 58,1 0,31 0,31 
n-hexane 1,000 50% 94 92 166 181 68,2 67,0 0,36 0,36 89,0 92,3 0,47 0,50 
n-hexane 1,000 25% 47 46 92 101 46,9 33,9 0,25 0,18 46,9 42,6 0,25 0,23 
n-hexane 2,000 95% 177 177 457 481 36,5 36,1 0,19 0,20 44,0 45,1 0,23 0,24 
n-hexane 2,000 75% 141 139 259 280 57,7 56,9 0,31 0,31 75,9 74,4 0,40 0,40 
n-hexane 2,000 50% 95 92 110 121 94,2 83,3 0,50 0,45 94,6 92,5 0,50 0,50 
n-hexane 2,000 25% 47 45 56 63 46,8 45,4 0,25 0,25 46,8 45,4 0,25 0,25 
n-octane 1,000 95% 194 190 516 563 8,5 4,3 0,04 0,02 10,5 6,3 0,05 0,03 
n-octane 1,000 75% 152 148 362 402 11,1 6,7 0,05 0,03 14,6 9,5 0,07 0,05 
n-octane 1,000 50% 102 98 186 211 17,9 15,5 0,09 0,08 25,9 18,8 0,13 0,10 
n-octane 1,000 25% 51 49 103 118 20,2 20,2 0,10 0,10 30,7 21,9 0,15 0,11 
n-octane 2,000 95% 193 189 512 559 8,5 5,7 0,04 0,03 10,5 7,1 0,05 0,04 
n-octane 2,000 75% 153 148 290 324 14,4 12,7 0,07 0,06 19,4 15,8 0,10 0,08 
n-octane 2,000 50% 103 99 124 141 27,4 30,2 0,13 0,15 41,2 33,6 0,20 0,17 
n-octane 2,000 25% 51 47 63 30 31,2 42,1 0,15 0,22 47,5 47,3 0,23 0,24 
Gasoline 2 1,000 95% 194 186 535 563 64,5 41,4 0,32 0,21 75,2 66,7 0,37 0,34 
Gasoline 2 1,000 75% 153 147 374 412 75,2 48,5 0,37 0,25 92,1 60,6 0,45 0,31 
Gasoline 2 1,000 50% 102 98 193 216 97,3 91,8 0,48 0,47 102,2 71,3 0,50 0,36 
Gasoline 2 1,000 25% 51 49 107 121 51,0 48,7 0,25 0,25 51,0 48,7 0,25 0,25 
Gasoline 2 2,000 95% 193 185 527 554 65,2 45,2 0,32 0,23 76,1 70,3 0,37 0,36 
Gasoline 2 2,000 75% 153 150 300 311 92,8 73,6 0,45 0,37 115,2 106,3 0,56 0,54 
Gasoline 2 2,000 50% 103 98 128 144 102,9 98,3 0,50 0,50 102,9 73,2 0,50 0,37 
Gasoline 2 2,000 25% 51 49 65 74 51,0 48,6 0,25 0,25 51,0 48,6 0,25 0,25 
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Figure 3. Evaporation of winter gasoline for pipeline puncture scenarios.  
Improved thermodynamic modelling of mixtures (SAM) predicts less 
evaporation than PHAST but still much more than the baseline tank 
overfill scenario (FABIG).  Evaporation is expressed as fraction of 
import rate. 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Early work 
In risk consultancy work of a fuel depot in 2008, COWI reported (confidential 
and unpublished) that PHAST output suggested that spray evaporation 
following pipeline puncture could produce very large vapour clouds.  The 
implications were not fully realized however, as generally accepted models of 
evaporation from tank overfill events were not available, and overfill events 
were generally believed to be the worst-case scenario.   
In 2016, the issue resurfaced (confidential and unpublished), in part because an 
import pipeline to a fuel depot had been severely deformed when the raised 
crane of a passing truck struck a pipeline road overpass.  Hazard analysis using 
PHAST clearly showed that major pipeline damage produced the largest hazard 
range of all the loss of containment scenarios considered for the fuel depot.  
Key inputs to some models were approaching the limits of the recommended 
range of application however, in particular low orifice back-pressures.  An 
additional concern was that the findings, while technically defensible and 
correct, might be an artefact of PHAST's simplified modelling of properties of 
wide-range multi-component mixtures.  Although the software developer did 
not advice against the computation procedure, doubts remained.  Those doubts 
eventually led to this work.   
5.2 Improved thermodynamic modelling 
The work reported here largely supports those doubts.  Advanced 
thermodynamic modelling indicates that PHAST does overestimate evaporation 
from spray releases of mixtures.  The main finding stands however:  Modelling 
shows that spray evaporation following puncture of an import gasoline pipeline 
can evaporate large quantities of fuel, perhaps exceeding the evaporation from a 
Buncefield-type tank overfill event by a factor two or more. 
There are many challenges associated with extracting a single stand-alone 
model from a suite of integrated models.   PHAST modelling of the behavior of 
airborne droplet in a moving mass of entrained air takes place in the complex 
UDM module, not the spray module.  Stand-alone modelling of the UDM 
module is outside the scope of this project however, and the issue was managed 
though model tuning.  As a result, we can only state that PHAST likely 
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overestimates spray evaporation for wide-range multicomponent mixtures.  We 
cannot state how much.   
5.3 Mixing with air 
The main concern in hazard analysis of fuel depots is a loss of containment 
event leading to an Open Flammable Cloud Explosion (OFCE).  An OFCE has 
three principal characteristics: 1) A release of a large quantity of flammable 
vapour.  2) Good mixing with air to produce a large volume within the 
flammability limits, since rapid flame propagation and blast effects will only 
occur through those premixed explosive regions.  Moreover, there must 3) be a 
delay, of undefined duration, before ignition, to build up a large cloud [2].  
Calm conditions represent a worst case [22], [32] 
This paper only considers the first step, the quantity evaporated.  It has been 
argued however, that good mixing with air may be the critical step in OFCE 
hazard analysis [2].  The cascade and splash evaporation at Buncefield likely 
led to near-optimal (stoich) mixing [13]. 
More research is needed to determine whether spray and fountain evaporation 
from a puncture event will also lead to near-stoich mixing with air.  We 
hypothesize however, that the freefall stage of a fountain release may indeed be 
comparable to a cascade release.  We find it noteworthy that the authors of a 
recent review of past large vapour cloud explosions conclude that "smaller" 
vapour release rates, a term the authors reserve to rates lower than 100 kg/s, i.e.  
similar to those considered in this paper, seem to have a propensity to produce 
an OFCE rather than a flash fire [32]. 
5.4 Re-appraisal of the hazard potential of fuel depots 
As stated in the introduction, the Buncefield explosion in 2005 fundamentally 
changed the perceived hazard potential of gasoline fuel depots.  Immediately 
following the accident, the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 
accepted what appeared to be the view commonly held by the industry and the 
relevant expert community in Britain: that this was an unprecedented event [2]. 
Failures should be valued as unique learning opportunities.  Evidently, it makes 
good sense to share the lessons learned from unwanted outcomes in order to 
minimize the number of times the same lessons have to be learned [33].  It is 
therefore remarkable that a number of overfill-related gasoline vapour cloud 
explosions had occurred on earlier occasions, e.g.  Houston, TX, USA, 1962; 
Baytown, TX, USA, 1977; California, USA, 1981; Newark, NJ, USA, 1983; 
Naples, Italy, 1985; and Sri Racha, Laem Chabang, Thailand, 1999 [1], [4], [6], 
[34].  Some 20 years before Buncefield, authors had discussed the hazard 
potential [35].  In this light, the Buncefield incident may well stand out as 
exceptional, not that it took place, but that it was thoroughly studied and 
lessons shared. 
Johnson reflects on whether the Buncefield incident was foreseeable.  The 
answer is largely affirmative: All the elements of the incident were recognised 
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as being possible [6].  Mannan arrives at a similar conclusion: There was 
nothing new or unforeseeable about what happened at Bunceﬁeld [34], [36].  
Despite availability of evidence, there was limited appreciation of the hazard. 
An analogous situation may currently exist for spray releases following 
pipeline puncture.  Previous incidents have taken place.  In Saint Herblain, 
France, 1991, a release of gasoline from a transfer pipe inside a bund produced 
a vapour cloud which upon ignition produced extensive explosion damage [37].  
At a terminal in Jaipur, India, 2009, a large leak occurred from a valve on a 
tank outlet.  The leak resulted in a fountain or spray of gasoline directed 
upwards from the valve driven by the hydrostatic pressure in the tank only, i.e. 
a very modest overpressure.  The leak produced a very large cloud which 
exploded with devastating force [38].  Other authors  [13], [22] have 
recognized that many of the physical processes that apply in a spray release are 
common with the overfilling problem.  Yet, there appears to be limited 
appreciation of the hazard. 
5.5 Future research  
Before Buncefield, only the release of superheated liquids (e.g.  propane and 
butane) were thought to be capable of producing large vapour clouds [2], [5].  
Early spray modelling work is largely concerned with releases of flashing 
liquids, e.g.  [24], [39].  The literature on spray releases of moderately volatile 
liquids appears sparse.   
An experimental study on rainout data for spray releases of non-flashing water 
and xylene [20] showed that droplet behaviour in the jet is more complex than 
PHAST assumes.  The spray is initially dominated by a small number of large 
non-spherical droplets that undergo secondary break-up further downstream the 
nozzle.  Another experimental study [21] suggested that that the current UDM 
model implemented in PHAST under-predicts the droplet size, in particular for 
gasoline releases.  Small droplet will over-predict evaporation, although 
secondary breakup may nullify this.  More research is clearly needed. 
A better understanding of the effects of the different input parameters to the 
estimation procedure is needed.  A detailed sensitivity and uncertainty analysis 
using global methods such as Monte Carlo techniques [40] will help quantify 
the contribution of the inputs to predicted evaporation rates.  Commercial 
gasoline is manufactured to meet engine requirements and its exact chemical 
composition is inherently ill-defined and variable.  This should also be 
accounted for in sensitivity analysis.   
Above all, however, future research should rectify the scarcity of large-scale 
experimental data for spray releases of moderately-volatile liquids to aid model 
verification    
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6 Conclusion 
Hazard analysis using PHAST predicts that extensive evaporation will take 
place due to spray and fountain effects following a pipeline puncture.  To 
evaluate the significance of the spray release mechanism in hazard analysis of 
fuel depots, the quantity evaporated is compared against the quantity 
evaporated in a Buncefield type overfill event, which is currently considered to 
be the worst-case event for fuel depots. 
This paper examines releases of two pure substances and a mixture: Moderately 
volatile hexane, low-volatility octane and winter gasoline.  PHAST modelling 
consistently shows that a spray release can evaporate more fuel than an overfill 
event, in particular for gasoline, the substance of key interest to this paper due 
to the ubiquity of gasoline storage sites in society. 
Proper modelling of evaporation of wide-range multi-component mixtures such 
as gasoline is challenging.  For calculation of thermodynamic properties, 
PHAST represents the mixture with a pseudo-pure component, a simplification 
which may introduce errors.  We develop a stand-alone spray model with 
advanced thermodynamic capability.  Results suggest that PHAST does 
overestimate evaporation of mixtures.  Still, this paper finds that evaporation 
following pipeline puncture may exceed the evaporation from a Buncefield-
type tank overfill event by a factor two or more.  The finding may lead to a re-
appraisal of the hazard potential of pipelines and fuel depots. 
This leads to the overall conclusion that pipeline punctures may be the worst-
case scenario in hazard analysis of fuel depots.  This is a novel proposition, 
which runs counter to established hazard analysis practice.  While the incident 
at Jaipur, India, may provide some empirical support for this proposition, more 
research is clearly necessary, in particular large-scale experimental work for 
model verification, before conclusions of a more confident nature can be stated.  
In the meantime, a cautious approach in hazard analysis would be to include 
scenarios with spray evaporation from pipeline punctures. 
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7 Appendix A: Model for spray release 
evaporation from pipe damage 
A stand-alone model for spray release evaporation from pipeline puncture has 
been implemented in MATLAB [27].  The model is independent from but 
faithful to PHAST as The stand-alone model mimics the approach taken in 
PHAST and is based on the same theoretical foundation.  The aim has been to 
provide an as faithful representation of the PHAST model as possible, within 
the time and budget constraints of this project.  The stand-alone model is then 
enhanced with advanced thermodynamic modelling capability for mixtures, a 
capability PHAST has not.  The purpose is to examine the effect of improved 
thermodynamic modelling of mixtures on the estimated amount of evaporation 
for spray releases. 
The following scenario is considered: A gasoline pipe is ruptured forming an 
orifice.  The liquid gasoline discharges and expands into the atmosphere, 
forming a stream of droplets, where gasoline evaporates and forms a vapour 
cloud.  The stream of droplets subsequently touches the ground and forms a 
pool. 
The model consists of 3 parts:  
1) A discharge due to rupture 
2) Droplet formation 
3) Droplet evaporation 
 
Input specification 
The model can be solved through the following input specification.   
Static pressure and temperature of the gasoline pipe: Pst and Tst 
Orifice (hole) diameter: dhole 
Average droplet trajectory angle: θ 
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Atmospheric pressure and temperature: Pa and Ta 
Furthermore, the following gasoline properties need to be calculated through a 
suitable equation of state [28] or obtained from a tabulated database [41], [42]. 
These properties are dependent on temperature T and pressure P. 
Vapour phase pressure: P(T) 
Liquid and vapour density: ρl(T,P) and ρv(T,P) 
Liquid and vapour enthalpy: hl(T,P) and hv(T,P) 
Liquid and vapour entropy: sl(T,P) and sv(T,P) 
Liquid phase and vapour phase heat capacity: Cpl(T,) and Cpv(T,P) 
 
Discharge due to pipe rupture 
When a gasoline pipes ruptures, the pressurized liquid is discharged and 
expanded through the orifice into the atmosphere.  The equations are based on 
the books of Street at al. on elementary fluid mechanics [43] and Mannan et al. 
on liquid discharge and loss of prevention [44].  The model is based on the 
following assumptions: 
The gasoline flow is in complete liquid state at the orifice. 
There are negligible pressure and temperature effects at the orifice. 
The velocity at the orifice u0 is given by Bernoulli’s equation for 
incompressible fluids 
 
st a
0
lst st st( , )
2
P P
u
T Pρ
=
−
  
(1) 
 
where Pst is the static gasoline back-pressure in the pipe, Pa is the atmospheric 
pressure, ρlst is the liquid density of gasoline at the static pipe pressure Pst and 
temperature Tst.  The orifice temperature T0 and pressure P0 is set equal to the 
atmospheric conditions, Pa and Ta: 
 0 aP P=  
(2) 
Puncture 
Puncture of an import gasoline pipeline-09 preprint.docx 
28 
.   
 0 aT T=  
(3) 
The orifice mass flux G0 is given then by  
 
0
0
0
G
u
v
=
 
(4) 
 0
l0 0 0
1
( , )
v
T Pρ
=
 
(5) 
with v0 being the specific volume ρl0 the liquid density at the orifice.  The 
frictional effect of convergent flow at the orifice reduces the overall mass flow 
rate.  The reduction is expressed through the discharge coefficient CD.  Here, it 
is assumed CD=0.6.  The overall release mass flow Q through the orifice is 
calculated using the orifice cross-sectional area A0 through 
 0 0DQ C AG=  
(6) 
 
2
0
2
holedA pi
 
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  
(7) 
After the orifice the gasoline fluid expands into the atmosphere.  The final 
velocity in the atmosphere is given by the following momentum balance: 
 
0
0
0
G
u
v
=
 
(8) 
 0
l0 0 0
1
( , )
v
T Pρ
=
 
(9) 
Due to negligible pressure effects at the orifice, there is no depressurisation 
assumed from the orifice pressure to the ambient pressure, hence no 
atmospheric expansion is calculated.  This assumption is reasonable, because 
there are not large pressure and temperature differences between the pipe and 
the atmosphere and the gasoline is in liquid state. 
Droplet formation 
For an aerodynamic break-up mechanism, the mean droplet diameter dda can be 
calculated using the critical Weber number, which accounts for the liquid-air 
interface, shear forces and surface tension forces [24]: 
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da 2
0 a
e
d
W
u
σ
ρ
=
 
(10) 
where σL is the surface tension of gasoline, Wecrit the critical Weber number 
and ρa the atmospheric density.  Following the guidelines of Brown et al.  [45], 
it is assumed that Wecrit=12 for low-viscosity fluids.  Assuming spherical 
droplets, the initial droplet mass can be written as 
 
t
3
da
d0 as
4
( ,P)
3 2
m
d
T
piρ  =  
   
(11) 
The number of released droplets per second can then be obtained using the total 
release mass flow rate Q: 
 d
d
0
Q
N
m
=
 
(12) 
 
Droplet evaporation 
The droplet evaporation model is based on the work of Woodward et al.  [25].  
We would like to explicitly refer to their work for more details on the 
fundamentals of the model equations. 
No droplet size distribution is used.  Hence, it is assumed that the larger 
evaporation due to larger droplets is compensated by the smaller evaporation of 
smaller droplets.  Therefore, all the calculations are performed for an average 
droplet with an initial droplet diameter equal to the mean droplet diameter. 
Woodward et al.  [25] assumed the droplets surrounded by a mixture of air and 
gasoline vapour.  In order to obtain the gasoline droplet mass and temperature 
as function of the distance to the orifice, a system of ordinary differential 
equations needs to be solved that includes a mass balance, an energy balance 
and a momentum balance.  The change in droplet mass is obtained through the 
mass transfer equation (see Eq.  (11)).  The change in the droplet temperature is 
described using an energy balance taking into account the temperature change 
due to heat transfer and heat of evaporation (see Eq.  (12).  The momentum 
balance (Eq.  (13)) accounts for the change in velocity ud: 
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(13) 
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 (15) 
In Eq.  (11) md is the droplet mass, s the distance from the orifice, Ad the 
surface of the spherical droplet, Kg the overall mass transfer coefficient, ρ the 
droplet density, C’ the Stefan flow correction factor, yg the mole fraction of 
gasoline in the vapour phase around the droplets, ys the equilibrium mole 
fraction of gasoline on the droplet surface, Td is the droplet temperature, and 
Tvap the vapour phase temperature of the vapour cloud surrounding the droplet.  
In Eq.  (12) hfg is the heat of evaporation, h the overall heat transfer coefficient, 
and CpL the liquid heat capacity.  In Eq.  (13) udz is the vertical components of 
droplet speed, Fbody the buoyancy force, Fdrag the drag force. 
The system of system of ordinary differential equations is solved for the 
following initial conditions: 
 d d0( 0)m s m= =  
(16) 
 d st( 0)T s T= =  
(17) 
 d 0( 0)u us= =  
(18) 
 vap a( 0)sT T= =  
(19) 
Eq.  (14) is the initial mass of the droplet derived from the volume of the 
spherical droplet using the mean droplet diameter.  The integration of the 
differential equations is terminated when the droplets hits the ground, this is 
approximated using the equation for the projectile motion 
 
2
0
end
( ) sin( )
2
u
s
g
θ
=
 
(20) 
where g is the gravitational constant and θ the average droplet's trajectory 
angle. 
In each integration step of the system of ordinary differential equations the 
temperature, mass and velocity dependent variables and constants that occur in 
Eq.  (11) to (12) need to be updated.  In the following the auxiliary equations of 
these variables are presented that are solved in each iteration step.  The 
following variables are all to be considered at position s, e.g.  the surface area 
of a droplet at position s is written as Ad(s). 
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The droplet surface area Ad is obtained from the droplet mass md, through 
calculating the droplet density ρ(Td, Pa), radius rd and volume Vd. 
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(23) 
The overall mass transfer coefficient Kg can be calculated using the Sherwood 
number Sh and the diffusivity of the gasoline in air, Da.   
 
a d
g
d
( )D
K
Sh T
r
=
 
(24) 
The mean temperature Tm is the difference between the evaporation 
temperature Tvap and the temperature at the droplet surface Td: 
 
vap d
m
2
T T
T
+
=
 
(25) 
The Sherwood Sh number is obtained through an empirical correlation of the 
Schmidt number Sc, the Reynolds number Re and the mass transfer number 
Bm: 
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(28) 
The correlation parameters are set to be a=1.03 and b=0.23.  hfg is the heat of 
vaporization, Cpv is the heat capacity of the gasoline vapour phase. 
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The correction constant C’ is made up of two terms: 1) a term for Stefan flow 
which accounts for enhanced evaporation at high mass flux, and 2) a correction 
for the temperature gradient on the diffusion coefficient as described by Barrett 
and Clement [46], where μ=1.8. 
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(29) 
The Reynolds number Re is found as follows 
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=
 
(30) 
where |uz-udz| is the velocity difference between the cloud and the droplet, ρcld is 
the cloud density and cloud and μa the dynamic viscocity of gasoline in air. 
The drag force, Fdrag, and the buoyancy force, Fbody, are obtained as follows 
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u u u |
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(31) 
 cldbod L dy ) V( gF ρ ρ−=  (32) 
ρL is the liquid density of gasoline and g is the gravitational constant. 
The drag coefficient CDd is depending on the Reynolds number: 
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(33) 
The heat transfer coefficient is obtained from Nusselt (Nu) and Prantl (Pr) 
number 
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(34) 
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(36) 
where k is the heat conductivity of gasoline. 
 
Pool evaporation ignored 
Evaporation is only considered while the material is airborne as droplets in a 
dispersing jet/fountain, not in pool evaporation after it has rained-out on 
ground.  Similarly, when computing evaporation from a Buncefield-type 
overfill event, we consider the contributions to evaporation from cascading 
falling liquid and splashing effects at the tank base only.  They contribute more 
to the source term than diffusive evaporation from a pool [14].  The 
simplification has additional benefits.  Because some of the lighter components 
evaporate while airborne in the spray/cascade phase, the composition of the 
material that enters the pool has changed.  PHAST is unlikely to take this in 
account.  The simplification also eliminates uncertainties related to how 
sensitive PHAST's pool evaporation model is to the representation of a mixture 
by a pseudo-pure component.  A more practical argument for ignoring step 4 is 
to avoid that arbitrary assumptions about drainage and pool area near the 
pipeline puncture, and similar pool (tank yard) area assumptions for the 
overfilled tank, influence the comparative analysis. 
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9 Software 
This study used Phast Risk (Version 8.0) from DNV GL software.  MATLAB 
[27] was used for the PHAST-based model using an advanced multi-component 
mixture model. 
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